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Civil Society and Gender-Based Violence:  





The transitional justice field has thus far neglected the nature, scope and impacts of 
civil society initiatives for addressing gender-based violence. Using a feminist 
framework of analysis, I examine the role of civil society tribunals as a transitional 
justice mechanism. Despite their limitations, I argue that civil society tribunals can 
provide recognition for victim suffering, as well as challenge dominant narratives, 
explore the underlying individual and structural causes of violence, and propose 
solutions to achieving non-violence and gender equality. Overall, I argue that 
transitional justice is a useful conceptual framework for examining civil society 
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Over the past few decades, feminist scholars, practitioners and activists have begun to 
examine the usefulness of various practices and processes for securing justice for gender-
based violence in the aftermath of armed conflict and politicised violence.2 Early attention 
tended to focus on the prosecution of wartime sexual violence under international criminal 
law,3 however more recently scholars have sought to examine the efficacy of other justice 
mechanisms, such as truth commissions, political apologies and local on-the-ground 
interventions, drawing attention to a range of gender-based harms beyond that of sexual 
violence.4 The common goals of feminist practical and analytical work in this field have been 
to not only problematise the historical silence surrounding gender-based harms, but to also 
challenge liberal-democratic, state-centric and neocolonial frameworks for addressing these 
                                                        
2 Gender-based violence is a contested term. The Council of Europe Convention (Art 3 d) defines it to mean 
‘violence that is directed against a woman because she is a woman or that affects women disproportionately’. This 
definition is problematic in treating ‘women’ as synonymous with ‘gender’, and implying that women and girls 
are exclusively victims of violence because of their gender, and equally that women and girls cannot be 
perpetrators of violence. My use of ‘gender-based violence’ in this article refers to a wide range of harms that are 
perpetrated because of the targeted victim’s gender. It is important to note that gender need not be the only reason 
for violence and theories of intersectionality are thus useful for critically examining the ways in which victims 
are targeted or affected on the basis of gender, race, ethnicity, sexuality, age and other factors. For instance, 
victims may be equally victims of conflict-related sexual violence as well as other gender-based pre-existing 
realities or post-conflict outcomes, such as socio-economic impoverishment, discrimination, harassment and other 
harms.  
3 See Askin Kelly War Crimes Against Women: Prosecution in International War Crimes Tribunals Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers The Hague 1997; Campbell Kirsten ‘The Gender of Transitional Justice: Law, Sexual 
Violence and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’ (2007) 1:3 International Journal 
of Transitional Justice 411; Franke Katherine ‘Gendered Subject of Transitional Justice’ (2006) 15 Columbia 
Journal of Gender and Law 813; Henry Nicola ‘Witness to Rape: The Limits and Potentials of International 
War Crimes Trials for victims of Wartime Sexual Violence’ (2009) 3(1) International Journal of Transitional 
Justice 114; Meron Theodor ‘Rape as a Crime under International Humanitarian Law’ (1993) 87:3 American 
Journal of International Law 424. 
4 See, for example, Buckley-Zistel Susanne and Ruth Stanley (eds) Gender in Transitional Justice Palgrave 
Macmillan London 2012; Kent Lia ‘Local Memory Practices in East Timor: Disrupting Transitional Justice  
Narratives’ (2011) 5 International Journal of Transitional Justice 434; Ross Fiona Bearing Witness: Women 
and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa Pluto Press London & Sterling, Virginia 2003. 
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intersecting harms, and the impacts that such processes and mechanisms have on victim-
survivors of gender-based violence.5  
In response to some of the shortcomings of more conventional justice measures, such as 
international courts or tribunals, non-state civil society organisations have mobilised in 
innovative ways to seek justice on behalf of, and in concert with, victim-survivors of mass 
atrocities. Although rarely framed as a transitional justice response, one innovative 
mechanism of justice is the civil society tribunal, also known as ‘people’s tribunals’ or 
‘people’s courts’. Originating with the International War Crimes Tribunal or ‘Russell 
Tribunal’ that was set up in 1966 to investigate American foreign policy and military 
intervention in Vietnam, civil society tribunals have operated to address various past harms in 
different geographical locations. In particular, a number of ‘women’s courts’ have been 
established to respond to past forms of violence against women. Although the tribunals or 
courts differ in their format and function, some are ‘mock’ proceedings that are modelled on 
conventional international war crimes courts, ultimately serving to problematise past 
impunity for gender-based atrocities, while others function more like truth commissions, 
whereby victim-survivors publicly bear witness to past and present forms of discrimination 
and violence. To date, however, civil society tribunals have rarely been examined within the 
                                                        
5 Bell Christine and Catherine O’Rourke ‘Does Feminism Need a Theory of Transitional Justice? An 
Introductory Essay’ (2007) 1:1 International Journal of Transitional Justice 23; Charlesworth Hillary and 
Christine Chinkin The Boundaries of International Law: A Feminist Analysis Manchester University Press 
Manchester 2000; O'Rourke Catherine ‘Feminist Scholarship in Transitional Justice: A De-politicising 
Impulse?’ (2014) 51 Women's Studies International Forum 118. 
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growing field of transitional justice.6 This is despite civil society initiatives playing a 
potentially key role in post-conflict justice.7   
 
The twin aims of this article are to first justify the inclusion of civil society tribunals as a tool 
of transitional justice, and second, to demonstrate the usefulness of transitional justice to 
understanding civil society redress activity in response to conflict-related, gender-based 
violence. The article explores the following two questions: To what extent do civil society 
tribunals seek to fulfil transitional justice aims, such as perpetrator accountability, victim 
vindication, collective responsibility, societal reconciliation and establishing a historical 
record or ‘collective memory’ of the past? And what are the implications of addressing past 
forms of conflict-related gender-based violence through a grassroots approach that lacks the 
punitive powers of arrest, prosecution and conviction of more formal measures of justice?  
 
The first section of the article more broadly describes the role of civil society in responding 
to mass harm. The second section then draws on transitional justice as an analytical lens from 
which to examine the potentials and limitations of civil-society tribunals for specifically 
                                                        
6 Transitional justice refers to different legal and non-legal mechanisms or processes for responding to past 
wrongdoings, such as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and other harms perpetrated in the context 
of political violence. It includes criminal prosecutions, truth and reconciliation commissions, public apologies, 
memorials, reparations, and political and institutional reform. Transitional justice as a field of study has more 
complex manifestations, encompassing normative or aspirational goals surrounding shifts from a state of 
conflict to peace, as well as potentially more substantive political and social transformation, such as gender and 
racial equality, environmental sustainability or socio-economic redistribution. In other words, transitional 
justice, through these varied mechanisms of justice, can be both individualistic or societal, and short- or long-
term. Moreover, transitional justice provides a conceptual framework for bringing together competing 
discourses on the nature, extent and impact of past injustices, their contemporary effects, and the possibilities 
for future redress measures. See Henry Nicola ‘From Reconciliation to Transitional Justice: The Contours of 
Redress Politics in Established Democracies’ (2015a) 9:2 International Journal of Transitional Justice 199; Bell 
Christine ‘Transitional Justice, Interdisciplinarity and the State of the “Field” or “Non-field”’ (2009) 3:1 
International Journal of Transitional Justice 5; Teitel Ruti Transitional Justice Oxford University Press Oxford 
& New York 2000. 
7 The few exceptions include Crosby Alison and M. Brinton Lykes ‘Mayan Women Survivors Speak: The 
Gendered Relations of Truth Telling in Postwar Guatemala’ (2011) 5:3 International Journal of Transitional 
Justice 456; Schmid Evelyne ‘Gender and Conflict: Potential Gains of Civil Society Efforts to Include 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Transitional Justice’ Human Rights in Conflict — The Role of Civil 
Society paper presented at SHUR Project Final Conference, Luiss University, Rome, 4-6 June 2009. 
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addressing justice for victim-survivors of conflict-related gender-based violence. Here I use 
existing feminist critiques of transitional justice to examine the challenges and shortcomings 
of civil society activity for responding to gender-based harms in order to identify what can be 
learnt from innovative justice measures for responding to diverse forms of violence, both in 
peacetime and wartime. 
 
2. Civil society beyond the state: new horizons in transitional justice  
The term ‘civil society’ (civilis societas) is an ambiguous and contested term that has been 
the subject of much philosophical and political debate over the centuries. According to 
classical Greek philosophers, political power facilitates rational public debate and dialogue 
within civil society, which contributes to the ‘common good’ of the community.8 
Accordingly, civil society was not seen as separate from political power but rather viewed as 
a constituent part of a functioning self-governed political association of rulers and citizens 
who practice the civic virtues of truth, justice and self-restraint. 
 
Some centuries later, philosophers Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, in their respective social 
contract theories, viewed civil society in a co-existent relationship with the state, where civil 
society was responsible for maintaining peace and coexistence.9 This is in contrast to both 
Georg Hegel and Karl Marx, who saw civil society as a constituent part of a market economy 
governed by individual rights and private property. Marx, for instance, viewed civil society 
as a conglomeration of economic relationships within modern industrial, capitalist societies. 
The state, according to Marx, is the ‘superstructure’ of social relations that serves 
predominantly bourgeois interests, whereas civil society constitutes the ‘socioeconomic base’ 
                                                        
8 Ehrenberg John Civil Society: The Critical History of an Idea New York University Press New York 1999.  
9 Cohen Jean and Andrew Arato Civil Society and Political Theory MIT Press Massachusetts 1992.  
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of the state, which serves to further bolster the division of labour and private ownership. 
Antonio Gramsci similarly saw civil society as part of the state, where the capitalist state 
rules through force through ‘political society’ (the police, army, legal system), and consent 
through ‘civil society’ (family, education, trade unions) yet civil society also plays a crucial 
role in problem-solving.10 
 
Modern conceptions of civil society, in contrast, tend to conceptualise the essential elements 
of civil society as ‘autonomous forms of discourse, associations and solidarity [from the 
state]’.11 Civil society is the interface between private and public worlds, where ordinary 
people come together to acquire knowledge, make meaning of the world, and make plans of 
action through engagement with others.12 Jürgen Habermas’ civil society or ‘public sphere’, 
for instance, consists of ‘more or less spontaneously emergent associations, organizations and 
movements that, attuned to how societal problems resonate in the private life spheres, distil 
and transmit such reactions in amplified form to the public sphere’.13  
 
That is not to say, of course, that civil society is necessarily separate from both the economy 
and state in practice,14 yet civil society can and does constitute non-state actors whose very 
aim is to critique the role of the state. Although civil society can be supportive or work in 
collaboration with the state, civil society may be alternatively anti-politics – a site of 
problem-solving, critique, resistance or subversion. As Aaron Boesenecker and Leslie 
Vinjamuri note, ‘[c]ivil society is composed of actors who have varying levels of autonomy 
                                                        
10 As above.  
11 As above at viii.  
12 Habermas Jürgen The Theory of Communicative Action: Reason and Rationalization of Society translated by 
McCarthy Thomas Polity Press Cambridge 1987. 
13 Habermas Jürgen Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy 
translated by Rehg William MIT Press Massachusetts 1996 p 367.  
14 Nielsen Kai ‘Reconceptualizing Civil Society for Now: Some Somewhat Gramscian Turnings’ in Walzer 
Michael (ed) Toward a Global Civil Society Berghahn Books Providence 1995. 
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not only from the state and the economy but also from both dominant international normative 
frameworks and deeply embedded local cultural practices’. 15 
 
Owing to the proliferation of mass communication through online spaces and the 
transnationalisation or ‘postnational constellations’ of contemporary ‘global’ civil societies, it 
is important to look beyond a territorial, Westphalian frame and explore the role of global 
civil societies, such as human rights, feminist, indigenous, environmental and other 
transnational social movements, which have far more autonomy from the state.16  Nancy 
Fraser’s idea of ‘subaltern counterpublics’, for instance, embraces a more postmodernist 
conceptualisation of civil society. She defines this as ‘parallel discursive arenas where 
members of subordinated social groups invent and circulate counterdiscourses, which in turn 
permit them to formulate oppositional interpretations of their identities, interests, and 
needs’.17 Fraser claims that these counterpublics are instrumental in critiquing hegemonic 
domination in the bourgeois public sphere, contributing to the reduction in socio-economic 
disparities, and in doing so, helping to redraw the problematic boundaries that exist between 
public and private spheres.  
 
Despite enormous attention to civil society theory and practice in different disciplinary 
contexts, the transitional justice field has by and large neglected the nature, scope and impact 
of civil society justice initiatives, despite providing a rich body of literature on a diversity of 
other conventional and innovative mechanisms of justice, such as war crimes trials and truth 
                                                        
15 Boesenecker Aaron and Leslie Vinjamuri ‘Lost in Translation? Civil Society, Faith-Based Organisations and 
the Negotiation of International Norms’ (2011) 5:3 International Journal of Transitional Justice 364.   
16 Fraser Nancy Transnationalizing the Public Sphere: On the Legitimacy and Efficacy of Public Opinion in a 
Post-Westphalian World’ (1997) 24:4 Theory, Culture and Society 7. See also Kaldor Mary, Helmut Anheier 
and Marlies Glasius Global Civil Society Polity Press Cambridge 2003; Lipschutz Ronnie ‘Reconstructing 
World Politics: The Emergence of Global Civil Society’ (1992) 21:3 Millennium-Journal of International 
Studies 389; Walzer Michael Toward a Global Civil Society Berghahn Books Providence 1995. 
17 Fraser above note 16.  
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commissions. This may in part be attributable to the predominant focus in transitional justice 
on the state as both actor and remedy for gross human rights violations, and the specific 
normative goal of state transition (e.g. the liberalising shifts in state power) in various 
transitional justice measures from war crimes tribunals to political apologies. As such, many 
harms have been excluded from transitional justice analysis unless they are somehow 
connected back to broader forms of state-sanctioned harm (e.g. if they occur as part of a 
pattern of atrocities during warfare) or are part of a prosecuting or redress body that is also 
indicting (legally or otherwise) individuals who are state-like actors for past wrongdoings. 
This state-centric focus also potentially renders other transitional justice goals less important, 
such as victim vindication or perpetrator accountability. Moreover, transitional justice has 
been limited by the ‘constitutive definitions about what constitutes crimes in need of 
rectification’ and ‘its applied norms and understandings about what constitutes an adequate 
practice of doing justice for historical violence, abuse, or systemic injustice’.18 For example, 
the crimes against the so-called ‘comfort women’19 during the Asia-Pacific War, and the civil 
society tribunal that was established in 2000 to address these wrongdoings, has received 
minimal attention within the field of transitional justice to date, yet both the harms and the 
response make it an interesting transitional justice example. 
 
                                                        
18 Buckley-Zistel Suzanne and Magdalena Zolkos ‘Introduction: Gender in Transitional Justice’ in Buckley-
Zistel Susanne and Ruth Stanley (eds) Gender in Transitional Justice Palgrave Macmillan Hampshire, UK & 
New York 2011 at 9 (emphasis original). 
19 The term ‘comfort woman’ is an euphemism to refer to between 50,000 to 200,000 women and girls who were 
kidnapped, rounded up, coerced, lured, tricked, sold and otherwise recruited into military ‘prostitution’ for the 
Japanese military during the Asia-Pacific War (1931-45). While the majority of comfort women were Korean, a 
large number were also from China, as well as from other Southeast Asian, Pacific Island, American and European 
countries. This comfort women issue and the redress responses to sexual enslavement are discussed in further 
detail below. See, for example, Hicks George The Comfort Women W.W. Norton & Company New York & 
London 1997. Qui Peipei, Su Zhiliang and Chen Lifei Chinese Comfort Women: Testimonies from Imperial 
Japan’s Sex Slaves UBC Press Vancouver 2013; Soh C. Sarah The Comfort Women: Sexual Violence and 
Postcolonial Memory in Korea and Japan The University of Chicago Press Chicago & London 2008. 
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Despite this neglect, as Roger Duthie notes,20 many transitional justice scholars agree that 
civil society plays an important role in transitional justice processes. For instance, civil 
society organisations have been instrumental in ‘promoting and supporting transitional justice 
experiments around the world’.21 Moreover, the success of transitional justice measures in 
part can be attributed to the organisation, expertise and participation of civil society 
organisations.22 Yet according to Iavor Rangelov, while civil society actors are crucial for 
developing, adapting and contesting transitional justice processes and structures, as well as 
normative justice goals, ‘[f]ew attempts have been made to develop analytical frameworks 
that may be useful for approaching a wider set of civil society encounters and engagements 
with transitional justice’.23 Rangelov defines civil society as ‘the range of non-state actors 
that engage with justice discourses and processes… and seek to influence them in some way, 
whether they be NGOs or civic associations or more loosely organised social movements and 
networks, media or individuals who shape the public conversation’.24 His ambivalent 
conception includes both supporters and critics of the state and/or the justice processes. He 
usefully proposes three different models of civil society interaction with transitional justice 
as:  
 
                                                        
20  Duthie Roger ‘Building Trust and Capacity: Civil Society and Transitional Justice from a Development 
Perspective’ Research Unit, International Center for Transitional Justice 2009. 
21 Brahm Eric ‘Transitional Justice, Civil Society, and the Development of the Rule of Law in Post-Conflict 
Societies’ (2007) 9:4 International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law 62. 
22 Hayner Priscilla ‘Responding to a Painful Past: The Role of Civil Society and the International Community’ in 
Bleeker Mô and Jonathan Sisson (eds) Dealing with the Past: Critical Issues, Lessons Learned, and Challenges 
for Future Swiss Policy, KOFF Series Working Paper, Swiss Peace, Bern 2005 at 45. See also Backer David ‘Civil 
Society and Transitional Justice: Possibilities, Patterns and Prospects’ (2003) 2:3 Journal of Human Rights at 
302-305; Crocker David A. ‘Transitional Justice and International Civil Society’ (1998) 14 Social Philosophy 
Today 147; Rangelov Iavor and Ruti Teitel ‘Global Civil Society and Transitional Justice’ in Albrow Martin and 
Hakan Seckinelgin (eds) Global Civil Society 2011: Globality and the Absence of Justice Palgrave Macmillan 
London 2011 p 162. 
23 Rangelov Iavor ‘Civil Society and Transitional Justice in the Balkans: Three Models of Interaction’ (2015) 1 
Security in Transition 3-4. 
24 As above at 5.  
10   
a) ‘participation’ in formal transitional justice mechanisms established by states 
and international actors; b) ‘contestation’ over questions of justice in the public 
domain; and c) ‘mobilisation’ of civil society itself outside formal justice 
processes.25  
 
While some transitional justice scholars have explored the role that non-state actors, such as 
non-governmental organisations, have played in the establishment, development and critique 
of transitional justice processes and outcomes (for instance, in: data collection; monitoring 
human rights abuses; representation and advocacy; consultation; service delivery; research 
and education and a range of other roles),26 the third model (the mobilisation of civil society 
outside formal justice processes) has attracted the least amount of attention in the transitional 
justice field to date. The remainder of this article therefore concentrates on this model 
through an examination of civil society tribunals, arguing that these tribunals represent a 
worthy site of investigation in the study of transitional justice. 
 
In the analysis below, I take a broad approach to ‘transitional justice’, where first ‘transition’ 
is defined as both a justice process and an outcome: as ‘gradual, cumulative, contested and 
perhaps incomplete’,27 and as encompassing a wide range of different goals, including that of 
state transition. Second, I include historical injustices, such as the crimes against the so-called 
comfort women or colonialism, as viable objects of study within the transitional field. Third, 
I use transitional justice as a unifying framework for bringing together competing discourses 
                                                        
25 As above at 3-4.   
26 See Backer David ‘Civil Society and Transitional Justice: Possibilities, Patterns and Prospects’ (2003) 2:3 
Journal of Human Rights at 302-305. See also Boesenecker and Vinjamuri above note 15; Hovil Lucy and 
Moses Crispus Okello ‘Editorial Note’ (2011) 5:3 International Journal of Transitional Justice 333; Simić 
Olivera and Zala Volčič Transitional Justice and Civil Society in the Balkans Springer New York, Heidelberg, 
Dordrecht & London 2014.  
27 Winter Stephen ‘Towards a Unified Theory of Transitional Justice’ (2013) 7:2 International Journal of 
Transitional Justice 231. 
11   
on the nature and extent of past injustices, and the nature of historical and contemporary 
response to these harms.28 Finally, although my conceptualisation of transitional justice 
decentres both law and the state, I nonetheless retain the importance of state transition or a 
shift in state power as one of a number of key normative goals of transitional justice. I also 
retain the importance of organised political violence and ‘extraordinary’ crimes carried out 
by political entities29 in order to circumvent an over-extended definition of transitional justice 
that could potentially include just about anything.30 Ultimately, I seek to demonstrate the 
importance of transitional justice frameworks for the analysis of civil society responses to 
conflict-related gender-based violence. 
 
 
3. Responding to mass harm: civil society tribunals 
Responding to so-called ‘ordinary’ crimes in domestic, peacetime contexts is almost always 
exclusively the province of the state. The state prosecutes the accused person, the violator of 
community norms, on behalf of the community. The offence is against both the state and the 
afflicted community. In Aristotelian terms, this community is essentially koinōnía politikḗ – a 
‘civil society’ with a set of norms and values which are shared by citizens on an equal footing 
under the rule of law. Citizens then have a shared interest in the prosecution of the offender. 
Yet who and what should bear the responsibility of criminal prosecution for crimes against 
humanity; crimes that are ‘organized attacks of the gravest and most barbaric kind carried out 
by political entities against groups under their control’?31 David Luban argues that offences 
against the ‘laws of humanity’ are international crimes that must be criminally tried by the 
international community: ‘[t]he analogy is straightforward’, he suggests, ‘states are to be the                                                         
28 Author above note 6. 
29 See Luban David ‘A Theory of Crimes against Humanity’ (2004) 29 Yale Journal of International Law 85 
30 See Henry above note 6. 
31 Luban above note 29. 
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community of states as individual subjects are to their own state; international criminal laws 
are norms of the international community in the same way that domestic criminal laws are 
norms of the state that enacts them’.32 But this positions the state, or the collection of states, 
as the central source of remedy for past harm. Moreover, the injustice emanating from the 
failure of states or the international community to prosecute grave violations renders the state 
as a particularly flawed mechanism of justice, and paves the way for alternative approaches 
to not only address the lacunae of conventional justice measures, but also actively critique the 
‘misrecognition’33 perpetuated by such measures.  
 
Civil society tribunals are one innovative, alternative approach to addressing the past 
wrongdoings of the state or state-like actors that have not been addressed by formal justice 
mechanisms. The first known civil society tribunal was the 1966 Russell-Sartre Tribunal that 
was set up by British philosopher and Nobel Prize winner Bertrand Russell, and hosted by 
French philosopher and writer Jean-Paul Sartre. The Russell-Sartre Tribunal convened two 
sessions in Sweden and Denmark with representatives from 18 different countries. The main 
aim was to conduct an investigation into American acts of aggression against Vietnam, 
Cambodia and Laos, and war crimes against civilians and prisoners of war under 
international law. The Tribunal examined different sources of evidence and unanimously 
found that the US government had committed acts of aggression and that government and 
armed forces were guilty of the ‘deliberate, systematic and large-scaled bombardment of 
civilian targets…’. It also found the US guilty of genocide against the people of Vietnam.34 
                                                        
32 As above at 124.  
33 Fraser Nancy ‘Social Justice in the Age of Identity Politics: Redistribution, Recognition and Participation’ in 
Peterson Grethe (ed) The Tanner Lectures on Human Values XIX University of Utah Press Salt Lake City 1998 
p 1.  
34 Duffett John (ed) Against the Crime of Silence: Proceedings of the Russell International War Crimes 
Tribunal, Stockholm, Copenhagen Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation 1968; Falk Richard ‘The Rights of 
Peoples (In Particular Indigenous Peoples)’ in Crawford James (ed) The Rights of Peoples Oxford University 
Press New York 1988 p 17.  
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Similar tribunals were set up in the decades that followed, including the Russell Tribunal II 
on Latin America that held three meetings in Rome and Brussels between 1973-76 
concerning predominantly the military dictatorships of Argentina, and Brazil. In 1979, the 
Permanent Peoples’ Tribunal was established as an international opinion tribunal, 
independent of state authorities. It examined a wide variety of cases, including the Armenian 
Genocide and the Bhopal disaster. Similar tribunals were established in Berlin in 2001 (on 
human rights in psychiatry), Brussels in 2005 (on Iraq) and Barcelona from 2009-12 (on 
Palestine). The most recent hearing of the Russell Tribunal took place in Venice in 
September 2014 on human rights issues in the East Ukraine war, finding the presidents of the 
Ukraine and the US, as well as NATO and the European Commission leaders, guilty of war 
crimes in Eastern Ukraine (albeit receiving limited mainstream media coverage). 
 
A number of women’s civil society tribunals have also been established over the past four 
decades. Some examples include the 1976 International Tribunal on Crimes Against 
Women;35 the 2010 International Tribunal on Crimes Against Women of Burma36; and the 
2010 Tribunal of Conscience for Women Survivors of Sexual Violence during the Armed 
Conflict in Guatemala.37 The most recent example is the 2015 Women’s Court that was 
established by activists from different countries and organisations from the former 
Yugoslavia. The Court, held in Sarajevo, was set up in order to provide ‘a space for women’s 
voices and women’s testimonies about the daily injustices suffered during the war and now, 
in peace’. It documented violence perpetrated during the 1990s conflicts in the former 
                                                        
35 See Russell Diana and Nicole Van de Ven Crimes Against Women: Proceedings of the International Tribunal 
Les Femmes Publications California 1976.  
36 See http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs20/Nobel_Tribunal-burma-2010-en-op.pdf (accessed 11 March 2016) 
37 Lykes M. Brinton and Alison Crosby ‘Creative Methodologies as a Resource for Mayan Women’s 
Protagonism’ in Hamber Brandon and Elizabeth Gallagher (eds) Psychosocial Perspectives on Peacebuilding 
Springer Cham, Heidelberg, New York, Dordrecht & London 2014. 
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Yugoslavia, as well as ‘everyday’ violence experienced since the end of the conflicts. The 
different forms of violence included: ethnic violence, military violence, gender-based 
violence (including sexual violence and intimate partner violence), exploitation, political 
repression, and structural, socio-economic violence. Described as a ‘feminist approach to 
justice’, the aims of the Court were to ‘write an alternative history’, collect women’s 
experiences of violence, and ‘strengthen global feminist-pacifist alliances and coalitions’ 
with the aim of encouraging punishment, influencing international justice institutions, and 
contributing to the documentation of gender-based violence and inequality. The Court’s 
activities included meetings, seminars, workshops, conferences, roundtables, various 
publications, documentary screenings, performances, exhibitions and personal testimonies 
from victim-survivors.38 This Court reflects what M. Brinton Lykes and Alison Crosby 
describe as transformative, embodied and creative methodologies of justice.39 
 
Most scholarly attention to date has focused on the 2000 Women’s International War Crimes 
Tribunal on Japanese Military Sexual Slavery.40 The Women’s Tribunal was instigated by the 
Violence against Women in War Network, Japan (VAWW-Net) and supported by NGOs 
throughout Asia. Like the Women’s Court in Sarajevo, the Tribunal was established to hear 
the testimonies of the suffering endured by victim-survivors, but was premised more squarely 
on a legal model of redress in order to determine the criminal liability of leading military 
figures, political officials and the Japanese state for the systematic enslavement of up to                                                         
38 See http://www.zenskisud.org/en/ (accessed 11 March 2016). 
39 Lykes and Crosby above note 37 at 147. 
40 See, for example, Chinkin Christine ‘Women’s International Tribunal on Japanese Military Sexual Slavery’ 
(2001) 95:2 The American Journal of International Law 335; Chinkin Christine ‘People's Tribunals: Legitimate 
or Rough Justice’ (2006) 24 Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice 201; Dolgopol Tina ‘The Judgment of the 
Tokyo Women’s Tribunal’ (2003) 28 Alternative Law Journal 242; Sakamoto Rumi ‘The Women’s International 
War Crimes Tribunal on Japan’s Military Sexual Slavery: A Legal and Feminist Approach to the “Comfort 
Women” Issue’ (2001) 3 New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies 49; Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal 
for the Trial of Japan’s Military Sexual Slavery (2001) Judgement on the Common Indictment and the Application 
for Restitution and Reparation, 4 December 2001, The Hague, The Netherlands http://www1.jca.apc.org/vaww-
net- (accessed 11 March 2016), p 19. 
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200,000 ‘comfort women’ in military brothels for the Japanese military during the Asia-
Pacific War (1931-45). The Women’s Tribunal was specifically modelled on a conventional 
international war crimes trial and operated as a continuation of the post-WWII Tokyo war 
crimes trial that failed to adequately address the enslavement of comfort women. The 
Tribunal, however, lacked the legal authority to enforce its verdicts.41  
 
In analysing these women’s courts, it is useful to consider a number of well-identified 
shortcomings of conventional forms of post-conflict justice (such as war crimes courts) in 
terms of responding to gender-based violence (which have been explored in transitional 
justice feminist critiques). In summary, they include: a failure to articulate the individual and 
structural causes of conflict-related gender-based harms; the failure to provide a safe space 
for victims to tell their stories; the failure to attribute perpetrator accountability beyond that 
of individual criminal responsibility; and the failure to establish a historical record of the 
past. These deficits correspond with the stated goals of women’s courts which attempt to 
explore underlying causes of gender-based violence, provide a safe space for victims, 
consider both individual and collective forms of responsibility, consciously contribute to the 
collective memory of the past, raise awareness of gender-based violence and discrimination, 
and propose strategies and recommendations for future action.  
 
Overall then, the strength of civil society tribunals is that they seek, by and large, to value  
redistribution (breaking the cycle of socio-economic disadvantage as a result of past 
wrongdoing), recognition (promoting respect, dignity and worth), transformation 
(accommodation of difference and structural change), and participation (ensuring full social 
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and political participation in representations of the past and how to redress wrongdoing in the 
present and future).42   
 
Operating outside the realm of the state, these women’s courts or tribunals are an example of 
Fraser’s ‘counterpublics’ in that they actively seek to honour the dignity of victim-survivors, 
articulate alternative discourses on the past, fill in the gaps in formal avenues of justice, and 
provide an important critique of the state and hegemonic, masculine power. But to what 
extent do civil society tribunals fill the gaps left by conventional transitional justice 
mechanisms? Do civil society tribunals achieve specific transitional justice goals such as 
accountability, reconciliation, peace, victim vindication and collective memory? And do civil 
society tribunals fall into the similar traps of more conventional forms of transitional justice 
mechanisms, such as war crimes tribunals? In the subsection below, I analyse some of the 
benefits and shortcomings of civil society mechanisms for addressing gender-based violence, 
focusing on civil society tribunals. 
 
3.1. Feminist critiques of civil society and transitional justice 
Lucy Hovil and Moses Chrispus Okello claim that there is a ‘dearth of strong civil society 
critiques’ in transitional justice analyses, and that future analysis of civil society activity 
should consider ‘the dynamics in the relationship between civil society actors and those they 
claim to represent; between civil society and the state; among various civil society actors; and 
between civil society and those who fund it’.43 They claim that civil society activity too often 
escapes scrutiny because it is perceived as a mechanism to keep in check the power of the 
                                                        
42 Fredman Sandra Discrimination Law Oxford University Press Oxford 2011 p 25. This is based on Nancy 
Fraser’s three dimensional model of justice as recognition (acknowledging the status of others); redistribution 
(fair distribution of benefits and burdens); and representation (symbolic representation through language) 
(discussed in further detail below). See Fraser Nancy ‘Reframing Justice in a Globalizing World’ in Global 
Inequality: Patterns and Explanations Held David and Ayse Kaya (eds) Polity Press Cambridge 2007 p 252.  
43 Hovil and Okello above note 26 at 334. 
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state and as such ‘civil society evokes an overwhelming faith in its benefit to society simply 
by virtue of its existence’.44  
 
The various women’s courts discussed above in this article have curiously been the subject of 
little critique, perhaps owing to the benevolence in which civil society initiatives are 
attributed, as well as the fact that they have received significantly less public attention than 
national or international official justice mechanisms, such as international criminal courts.  
Although it may seem politically insensitive to critique well-meaning civil society initiatives, 
it is vital to do so in order to use these innovative processes as a source of inspiration or as a 
lesson for future justice responses to sexual violence – regardless of forum or context. Hovil 
and Okello implore that questions are asked about civil society activity, including whether 
civil society ‘delivers the goods in practice’, and whether civil society actors are ‘genuinely 
inclusive’.45 This, they argue, is important given that ‘transitional justice civil society activity 
has proliferated and remains relatively unmonitored’.46 
 
The benefit of using transitional justice as a conceptual framework for understanding the 
processes and outcomes of civil society tribunals for addressing gender-based harms is that 
such a framework can bring together competing discourses on the nature, scope and impacts 
of redress activity, including civil society redress activity.47 These debates are important 
conversations about justice and power in the aftermath of conflict. This approach is supported 
by other transitional justice scholars. For instance, Suzanne Buckley-Zistel and Magdalena 
Zolkos suggest that although there are limits to transitional justice as a concept due to its 
restrictive parameters, they nonetheless encourage a critical gender perspective to examining                                                         
44 As above at 334. 
45 As above at 333.  
46 As above at 336.  
47 Henry above note 6. 
18   
the exclusions and inclusions, the global operations of power, the shaping of norms and the 
ideological constructs of gender within transitional justice. They write:  
 
…critical gender analysis traces the processes whereby gendered subjectivity is 
constructed in social and political life, and how this subjectivity is formed and 
perpetuated though diverse systems of knowledge… It thus draws attention to the 
subjects at the margins of political communities – those that on the basis of gender, 
class, ethnicity, or other categories of social differentiation tend to be regarded as 
‘invisible’ or ‘silent’, or unable to exert political participatory agency.48 
 
Exploring the shortcomings, problems, and ambivalent effects, as well as benefits, of civil 
society redress activity, can be guided by critiques proffered by feminist and transitional 
justice scholars. Some feminist scholars, for instance, claim that transitional justice is another 
powerful global project that is constructed around a false, apolitical universalism that is 
restricted to specified ‘extraordinary’ events, with the effect of framing justice in narrow, 
rights-centric terms, and in doing so, overlooking structural forms of violence and 
inequality.49 Others claim that transitional justice is androcentric. Bell and O’Rourke,50 for 
instance, argue that the emphasis of democratic transition in transitional justice prioritises 
‘male-defined political violence’, including violations of civil and political rights as opposed 
to socio-economic and cultural rights.51  
 
                                                        
48 Buckley-Zistel and Zolkos above note 18 at 19.  
49 Nagy Rosemary ‘Transitional Justice as Global Project: Critical Reflections’ (2008) 29:2 Third World 
Quarterly 275.  
50 Bell and O’Rourke above note 5.  
51 See also Buckley-Zistel and Zolkos above note 18 at 1; Schmid above note 7. 
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While these critiques more broadly concern transitional justice as a field, feminist scholars 
have been also instrumental in pointing to the shortcomings of transitional justice practice, 
mostly with a focus on what I term representational deficits or shortcomings. For instance, 
scholars have pointed to the problematic effects relating to demands for, or promises of, 
catharsis and closure that transitional justice mechanisms offer.52 Ruti Teitel writes that 
transitional justice promises a kind of closure but does so at a cost:  
 
These rituals attempt to relegate to the past the worst of this century, while also 
propounding a workable shared narrative for the future. By these practices, a line is 
drawn delineating the parameters of that collective memory to be preserved: what is 
to be remembered and what repressed; what is to be abandoned and what validated; 
what is to be rendered incontestable and what will remain controverted . . . . As such, 
transitional practices have an ambivalent character, the resort to these practices in 
political flux is in the service of unity; yet, there is also a loss.53 
 
Others have argued that transitional justice approaches to addressing mass harm serves to 
consolidate the notion of perpetual victimhood. Victim narratives of suffering may also be 
co-opted for other agendas, such as serving nationalistic goals.54 Some scholars have pointed 
to the exclusions of men and boys from redress activity for gender-based harms,55 while 
others have problematised the hegemony of international law and the neocolonial impulses of 
justice, even in unofficial, non-state mechanisms.56 It is claimed, for instance, that the 
                                                        
52 Orford Anne ‘Commissioning the Truth’ (2006) 15:3 Columbia Journal of Gender and Law 851. 
53 Teitel above note 6 at 229-30. 
54 Franke above note 3 at 813. 
55 Buckley-Zistel and Zolkos above note 18. 
56  Dhawan Nikita ‘Transitions to Justice’ in Buckley-Zistel Susanne and Stanley Ruth (eds) Gender in 
Transitional Justice Palgrave Macmillan Hampshire, UK & New York 2011.  
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reliance on political and intellectual elites57 is a further source of power imbalance between 
victims and activists or international experts. Moreover, regardless of the forum, transitional 
justice measures may promote a false universalism as well as generate problematic 
representations of suffering.58 This in turn runs the risk of creating a spectacle of pain and 
suffering.59 Finally, the reinforcement of a false dichotomy between conflict and post-conflict 
contexts may in turn reinforce the notion that gender-based violence only happens in 
wartime, by strangers and not in times of so-called peace.60 
 
To what extent to civil society tribunals embody or enact these representational problems? In 
reflecting on the 2010 Tribunal of Conscience for Women Survivors of Sexual Violence 
during the Armed Conflict in Guatemala, Crosby and Lykes explore many of these 
limitations, while also acknowledging the benefits of civil society activity to victim-survivors 
and their communities: 
 
Truth-telling processes, in which documentation relies on the personal testimonies of 
survivors who have been directly or indirectly affected by the violations under 
consideration, tend to be framed within the liberal language of human rights and 
emphasize the experience of individuated harm, particularly bodily harm. They also 
focus on this harm as a particular ‘event,’ rather than as part of the broader structural 
relations of power that shape and inform the construction of the subject within her 
social context. Such rights-based discourse is rooted in the assumption that, as [Fiona] 
Ross puts it, ‘“violation” necessarily produces “victims,”’ and this is a gendered 
relation. Violence produces women victims, the underlying assumptions being that                                                         
57 Chinkin above note 39.  
58 Ross above note 3 at 332; Soh above note 19.  
59 Lykes and Crosby above note 37. 
60 Valji Nahla Gender Justice and Reconciliation Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung 2007. 
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victims are gendered female, that women are all the same and that, within the 
individuated framework of rights violations and bodily harm, the harm they 
experienced was sexual violence. Thus, sexual harm is reified as the gendered face of 
war.61  
 
Although it is crucial to examine the array of representational deficits, shortcomings or issues 
in the analysis of the processes and outcomes of transitional justice redress activity, it is 
equally important to address the extent to which civil society tribunals, or women’s courts in 
particular, contribute to two other important justice goals as articulated by the critical theorist 
Nancy Fraser: recognition and redistribution.62  
 
First, according to Fraser, recognition entails acknowledgement of the identity or status of 
the ‘other’ and the cultural injustices against these groups which are ‘rooted in social patterns 
of representation, interpretation, and communication’.63 Such injustices include the 
‘everyday’ and the ‘extraordinary’ and in fact, potentially merge them together: cultural 
domination by one culture by another; nonrecognition or invisibility within one’s own 
culture; and disrespect through disparaging stereotypes and representations in everday life. 
The mass sexual enslavement of comfort women, for instance, is not simply about the daily 
abuse that women and girls endured in the military brothels throughout the Asia-Pacific War, 
but it also concerns a much broader story about impoverishment and abuse prior to their 
incarceration, as well as after their release back into their communities.64 The Women’s 
Tribunal that was set up in 2000 as a civil-society, mock war-crimes tribunal, was an attempt 
                                                        
61 Lykes and Crosby above note 37 at 462.  
62  Fraser above note 42. See also Henry Nicola ‘The Law of the People: Civil Society Tribunals and  
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to further consolidate respect, dignity and worth to the former comfort women as  ‘collective 
subjects of injustice’.65 As the Women’s Tribunal was set up to adjudicate gendered crimes 
that the Tokyo Tribunal failed to address, and the Tribunal sat ‘as if it were a continuation of 
the [1946] IMTFE [Tokyo Tribunal] and the subsidiary trials held in the Asia-Pacific’,66 it 
served to address not only the misplaced stigma and shame of past violence, but also the 
injustice of what Fraser calls ‘misrecognition’67; namely, cultural, social, political and legal 
amnesia and denial that has plagued this issue since the end of the Second World War. 
 
In addition to this, the Women’s Tribunal sought to provide a clear statement about 
individual and collective criminal responsibility using the language of international law and 
the trial format to condemn the wrongdoings against the comfort women. This had the effect 
of raising further awareness of the issue specifically, but also brought international attention 
more broadly to the prevalence and impacts of wartime sexual violence. The Tribunal also 
contributed to a collective memory of the past through its creation of a permanent public 
record (including a lengthy judgement as well as other documents and materials). Finally, the 
Tribunal provided a space for victim-survivors to come together to tell their stories in a non-
adversarial context, where the multiple physical, psychological, financial and social harms 
that they suffered were duly acknowledged.68  
 
Second, Fraser defines ‘redistribution’ as the fair distribution of benefits and burdens which, 
as a practical socio-economic tool, is not distinct to that of recognition.69 A reparative model 
that seeks to provide victims with an array of redistributive remedies may include restitution 
                                                        
65 Fraser above note 33 at 8. 
66 Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal above note 40. 
67 Fraser above note 33. 
68 See Henry 2015b. 
69 Fraser above note 8. 
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(restoring victims to their original situation where possible) and monetary compensation for 
material and emotional damages. Compensation for past wrongdoings, for instance, helps to 
acknowledge not simply the psycho-social harms, but also the socio-economic and 
intergenerational impacts of egregious acts. But individual reparative measures are not the 
only means of redistribution in the context of gross human rights violations. Redistribution 
would also entail economic restructuring; the reorganisation of the division of labour; and 
other fundamental transformations to the political economy.70  
 
As a mock, civil-society tribunal, the Women’s Tribunal could not make arrests and could 
only provide recommendations for redress to governments, however, it was able to avoid 
some of the problems inherent in more conventional transitional justice mechanisms, such as 
international war crimes courts, including an almost exclusive focus on individual criminal 
responsibility. The Tribunal was nonetheless premised on the articulation of legal harms 
using international criminal law as the benchmark and it did therefore focus on proving 
charges laid out in the indictments against named individuals for rape and sexual slavery as 
crimes against humanity. Although the Tribunal judgement did outline the structural 
injustices, such as the comfort women’s vulnerability to ‘recruitment’ into the comfort 
stations (whether that was kidnapping, coercion or some other method), the fixation on legal                                                         
70 Fraser above note 33 at 7. It is interesting to note that in December 2015, a bilateral agreement was reached 
between Japan and South Korea regarding the comfort women issue. Under the agreement Japan promised to pay 
South Korea 1 billion yen to set up a foundation to support the few surviving comfort women, and to provide a 
stronger apology to the comfort women. South Korea in return promised to consider the matter ‘finally and 
irreversibly’ resolved and to consider the removal of the comfort women statue outside the Japanese embassy in 
Seoul. While this redress example does not concern the 2000 civil-society Women’s War Crimes Tribunal as 
such, it is an important reminder about the importance of processes of transitional justice. While the agreement, 
for instance, attempts to strike a deal that recognises the harm against the comfort women in clear and 
unambiguous terms, as well as provide some sort of redistribution in the form of monetary compensation, it has 
been criticised by various groups such as Amnesty International and the UN Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) because political leaders failed to consult victim-survivors about the 
details of the agreement, and many victims want both a direct apology and direct compensation. See Sasazawa 
Kyoichi and Yomiuri Shimbun ‘U.N. Panel Criticizes “Comfort Women” Deal’ The Japan Times. 8 March 2016: 
http://the-japan-news.com/news/article/0002797179 (accessed 11 March 2016); Tiezzi Shannon ‘South Korea’s 
“Comfort Women” Reject Deal with Japan’ The Diplomat. 30 December 2015: 
http://thediplomat.com/2015/12/south-koreas-comfort-women-reject-deal-with-japan/ (accessed 11 March 2016). 
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harms were largely at the expense of exploring the more deeply embedded structural factors 
underlying the systematic sexual enslavement of comfort women, such as colonialism, 
patriarchy and capitalism.71  
 
By way of contrast, the more recent 2015 Women’s Court in the former Yugoslavia 
specifically includes a much more expansive definition of wrongdoing to include socio-
economic disadvantage and discrimination, in addition to gender-based harms perpetrated 
during the armed conflicts in the former Yugoslavia. However, this court is quite different to 
the Women’s Tribunal which modelled a conventional criminal trial for crimes against 
humanity. There are of course strengths and weaknesses associated with both forms of 
justice. A mock trial, for instance, may be heavily focused on questions of individual 
criminal responsibility and the direct crimes perpetrated during the period under examination 
which may weaken broader structural forces and their intersections, but yet may draw on 
existing legal frameworks and decisions as a source of authority that other courts that take a 
much broader approach essential lack. Regardless of form, like any other civil-society-led 
justice measures, or indeed formal justice mechanisms, the key justice question concerns 
both the processes of justice (e.g. the extent and nature of victim participation and inclusion), 
and also the actual outcomes and impacts that such measures have on achieving 
transformation and change. The latter of course will depend largely on the broader publicity 
that such courts attract, and the ways in which governments will take on board their claims 
and recommendations. 
 
Although participants’ voices are often heard in innovative, supportive and respectful ways 
in civil society tribunals addressing gender-based violence, especially compared to 
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conventional justice measures, little is currently known about the impacts of women’s courts 
since there have been very few studies to date exploring the impacts on victim-survivors.72 
As such, little is known about how these courts function as a truth-telling forum or to what 
extent they provide relief or catharsis to victims. Moreover, while civil society tribunals seek 
to promote recognition of past injustices, as well as the injustice of other formal mechanisms 
that have failed to address these harms, it is difficult to measure their influence on states or 
international bodies, nor whether their activity has led to shifts in state power.73 In fact, 
transnational civil society entities may have weaker influences on the state in some 
circumstances, as civil society tribunals lack the authority and force to fully contribute to 
political transition and structural change, or to implement reparative measures, such as 
compensation, restitution or other symbolic acts (such as apologies) to victims.  
 
Despite the varied uncertainties surrounding the efficacy of women’s courts, they do, 
however, play an important role in contributing to the documentation of victim (and 
sometimes perpetrator) experiences, and provide institutional recognition of the pain and 
suffering endured. For many of course this will never satisfy justice needs in the absence of 
national or international criminal prosecution and punishment, or in the absence of a full and 
frank apology from perpetrators and the state, or owing to the failure of the state to introduce 
a compensation scheme. Indeed, civil society tribunals should not be viewed as a 
replacement for formal and conventional justice measures, or as a panacea for victim-
survivors in terms of recovery and healing.  
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Overall, while civil society tribunals lack the authority and force that can contribute to 
transformative political transition and structural change (which some might argue is the 
primary goal of transitional justice), these tribunals nonetheless have the capacity to 
contribute to shifts in state power and bring awareness to historical injustices. Yet the goals 
of transitional justice go beyond that of the state. At an individual level, such measures may 
provide support and validation for victims of gender-based violence. At a societal level, these 
tribunals can challenge dominant narratives, explore the underlying individual and structural 
causes of violence, and propose solutions to achieving non-violence and gender equality. 
Furthermore, while civil society justice measures are an important signal of the limits as well 
as possibilities of justice, like conventional justice measures, they too should not be immune 
from critical inquiry if lessons are to be learnt and the transitional justice field is ultimately to 
be strengthened. 
4. Conclusion 
Civil society initiatives for responding to the past injustices of gender-based violence have 
rarely been analysed within the transitional justice field. This is in part due to the state-centric 
focus of transitional justice measures to date. This article, however, has sought to 
demonstrate the ways in which transitional justice is a useful theoretical lens through which 
to examine non-state forms of institutionalised redress based on three key reasons. First, a 
transitional justice framework provides the analytical tools to examine the nature and extent 
of both historical and contemporary forms of gender-based violence. Second, as Bell and 
O’Rourke claim, transitional justice can help to challenge the legitimacy of the state and 
advocate for more radical transformative change in achieving equality and social inclusion.74 
Third, transitional justice is a useful conceptual framework for examining the range of 
discourses on injustices, providing the necessary discussions about the what, who, how and 
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why of justice. In particular, transitional justice provides a way for critically examining the 
norms, structures, processes, outcomes and impacts of civil society initiatives, drawing on the 
invaluable feminist and other scholarly critiques of transitional justice as both an analytical 
field and a practice.  
 
While it is inherently difficult to measure the efficacy or impacts of civil society tribunals in 
terms of socio-economic redistribution, recognition of historical and contemporary injustices, 
transformation and structural change, or participation of victim-survivors and others,75 more 
empirical research on the impacts on participants could yield important insights into the 
potentials and limitations of such forums. Furthermore, more scholarly attention to the 
shortcomings of civil society activity can and should be undertaken. Although far from 
perfect, civil society tribunals serve as a lesson for future justice mechanisms – formal and 
informal, during peacetime or in post-conflict contexts, and for a whole range of egregious 
harms. Both their potential benefits and shortcomings are a reminder that justice itself is 
ongoing, complex, piecemeal and never complete, but nonetheless vitally important to the 
dignity and memory of survivors. Overall, discussion and critique should not undermine the 
processes and outcomes, or the civil society actors, many of whom work tirelessly to create 
an alternative and supportive space for victim-survivors to be heard. Rather critique should 
serve to strengthen both future civil society initiatives as well as more conventional forms of 
justice in responding to gender-based and other forms of violence. 
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